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In a lengthly but carefully argued article, Carmelo Ferlito1 
methodologically tackles an economic topic that, by his own 
admission, is very challenging: capital theory. Ferlito reminds 
us that capital goods form part of the capital structure not by 
virtue of their physical properties but by virtue of their 
economic function. The core of the capital theory that Ferlito 
develops rests on the idea that economics is not about things 
and their physical attributes, but about individuals and their 
understanding of things and their physical attributes. That is, 
economics is about subjectivism, and, since capital theory is a 
subset of economics, so should be capital theory. Ferlito thus 
tries to distance himself from the Bohm-Bawerkian strand of 
Austrian capital theory and to position himself in the Austrian 
strand started by Carl Menger and later picked up by the 
radical-subjectivist Ludwig Lachmann. 
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1) CARMELO FERLITO, For A New Capital Theoy: A Hermeneutical 
Approach, in «StoriaLibera. Rivista di scienze storiche e sociali», 4 
(2018), n. 7, p. 11-61. 
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To this end, Ferlito proposes an intriguiging distinction 
between potential and actual capital goods. Potential capital 
goods may become actual capital goods as a result of a 
subjective or, as Lachmann would later rechristen it and Ferlito 
prefers, a hermeneutical process. While potential capital goods 
are «goods that, in a specific moment in time, are thought to be 
suitable for generating a certain output when combined with 
other goods», actual capital goods «are actually implemented in 
such a production process»2. The point being that goods become 
potential capital goods by way of a hermeneutical moment in 
which different individuals might, even though they see the 
same physical object, interpret their situations differently and, 
as a result, assign different values to the productive capacities 
of the same potential capital goods. 
Ferlito continues by criticizing the neoclassical production 
function from the perspective of the capital theory he proposes. 
If we acknowledge that the heterogenous capital structure is 
composed, first, of all the goods and their combinations that are 
at some point thought to be suitable to contribute to the 
implementation of production plans (potential capital goods) 
and, secondly, of all the combinations of actual capital goods, 
then the structure of capital that «is determined by expectations 
and production plans … can hardly be viewed as stable over 
time»3. According to Ferlito, it follows that the neoclassical 
production function is «unable to grasp the essence of the 
production process»4, which consists of finding new 
combinations of capital goods over time. 
If a consistently subjectivist theory of capital does not 
depend on the physical character of capital goods and what 
matters for a good to become capital is what an individual, such 
as an entrepreneur, imagines can be done with it, then the 
                                                   
2) Ibidem, p. 35 (our emphasis). 
3) Ibidem, p. 46. 
4) Ibidem. 
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traditional separation of labor and capital is not helpful. Labor 
is capital. While the neoclassical production function assumes a 
separation between labor and capital, Ferlito follows Lachmann 
in suggesting that what matters for our understanding of 
capital is not which resources are man-made, but rather which 
goods can become man-used. If what matters is the use to 
which a good can be put, rather than where it originates from, 
then labor – but also land – is in fact included in the capital 
structure. Production output does not ensue from the 
mechanical mixture of land, labor and capital. Rather, output is 
a function of subjective expectations, the flow of time, and the 
implementation of actual capital (that includes land and labor). 
We agree with the overall methodological thrust that 
Ferlito develops in his analysis of capital. Here, however, we 
want to focus on two points that we embrace less 
enthusiastically. First, Ferlito tries to develop a method of 
measuring capital. We cannot help but wonder whether he 
should not be concerned with developing a way to understand 
and interpret the meaning of the capital structure rather than 
with trying to measure such a structure that is based on 
subjective expectations that change over time. Second, we wish 
Ferlito pushed his thinking about the production process from 
the perspective of his capital theory a little further to consider 
other kinds of goods that are not typically thought of as capital 
goods, but perhaps should be. We have in mind intellectual 
infrastructures, which on our account are jointly produced 
capital goods. 
Ferlito recognizes that «the heterogeneous nature of 
capital goods create [sic] several problems in order to reach a 
meaningful measurement for the value of capital goods»5. At 
the same time, however, he proceeds to ponder «if and how 
capital can be measured»6 employing his distinction between 
potential and actual capital. One of the conclusions is that «the 
                                                   
5) Ibidem, p. 38. 
6) Ibidem. 
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value of actual capital changes according to the different 
moments at which we are looking at it»7, partly because agents 
modify their expectations and acquire different interpretations 
based on which different ends/means frameworks make use of 
different capital goods. 
Ferlito does take into account that capital structures do not 
consist of things but rather of understandings and 
interpretations of how diverse artifacts can be used for 
productive purposes. Yet we must insist that if we see the 
capital structure as a kind of knowledge of complementary and 
substitute uses of things – that is, organized representations of 
reality through individual mental maps each giving order to 
reality in its own idiosyncratic way8 – then the usefulness of 
measurement of such a flow of knowledge as such is dubious. 
What we should instead attempt to do with such mental 
mapping that consists of diverse interpretations and that 
correspondingly motivates human action is to understand it and 
classify it9, rather than just attempt to measure it10. 
                                                   
7) Ibidem, p. 40. 
8) See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the 
Foundations of Theoretical Psychology, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1952. 
9) See LUDWIG M. LACHMANN, Capital and Its Structure, Sheed 
Andrews and McMeel, Kansas City 1978 (1956), p. 4 and p. 88-90. 
10) This does not necessarily mean that capital measurement is not 
useful. More precisely, our point is that perhaps capital measurement 
ought to serve a broader economic analysis rather than be performed 
per se. In a more mainstream (but still not fully orthodox modeling) 
spirit, Limam, Miller and Garzarelli (forthcoming: YASMINA RIM 
LIMAM - STEPHEN M. MILLER - GIAMPAOLO GARZARELLI, Output 
Growth Decomposition in the Presence of Input Quality Effects: A 
Stochastic Frontier Approach, in «German Economic Review») for 
example employ a measurement of the age of physical capital as a 
proxy for capital quality in an effort to understand how, in a sample 
of 90 countries, capital of different age differently contributes to 
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We now turn to the second and related point. If we believe 
that capital goods are defined by their economic function rather 
than by their physical characteristics, we must wonder whether 
a conceptual separation between land, labor and capital is 
meaningful. We do not think it is, but we believe that Ferlito 
does not make the best of this question. We want, therefore, to 
suggest another kind of good that is typically not properly 
accounted for by the neoclassical production function but that is 
not taken into account by Ferlito either. 
We refer to a particular kind of infrastructural resources, 
which run behind the background of any kind of social and 
economic interaction. We can say that these resources are 
«consumed nonrivalrously for some appreciable range of 
demand», that a «demand for the [infrastructural] resource is 
driven primarily by downstream productive activity», and, 
finally, that the infrastructural resource tends to «be used as an 
input into a wide range of goods and services»11. Typically, 
things like roads and highways, railways, bridges, lighthouses, 
water systems, power grids, optical fibers, etc., come to mind. 
The importance of these kinds of infrastructures is picked up by 
the neoclassical analysis of production. 
However, Ostrom and Hess12 and Frischmann13, among 
others, extend the analysis of physical infrastructures to include 
intellectual infrastructures. We might think of language as a 
central example of an intellectual infrastructure. But apart from 
                                                                                                                       
economic growth. We return to capital measurement below in an 
institutional guise. 
11) BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared 
Resources, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012, p. XIV. 
12) See ELINOR OSTROM - CHARLOTTE HESS, Understanding 
Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, MIT Press, 
Cambridge (Massachusetts) 2007. 
13) See FRISCHMANN, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared 
Resources, cit. 
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language, intellectual infrastructures «include a broad set of 
resources that create benefits for society primarily through the 
facilitation of downstream productive activities, many of which 
generate spillovers»14. They are simply non-rival inputs into a 
wide variety of outputs; think basic research, general purpose 
technologies, and ideas. Are these infrastructures capital goods? 
The importance of infrastructures seems to be most 
conspicuous in the case of its malfunction. This is especially 
true when we talk about «legal infrastructure»15. Most people 
are well aware of the importance of physical and intellectual 
infrastructures. We are aware of the importance of uncongested 
highways or high-speed railways during our daily commutes 
and we are well aware of the enabling power of language. Such 
awareness becomes much more vivid when the road becomes 
congested, when the railway workers go on a strike, or when 
we cannot simply “plug in”, as Hadfield puts it, into a 
framework of people who would share our language or adhere 
to a common legal code. 
With legal infrastructure, which may be considered a 
subset of Frischmann’s intellectual infrastructure, things are 
different to the extent that the enabling function of legal and 
institutional rules is almost always hidden, it mostly runs in the 
background; what we typically notice about law is that it tells 
us what not to do. 
Hadfield, as Buchanan16 also similarly suggested, makes 
the case that legal infrastructure is a form of capital17. Just like 
with other kinds of infrastructure, we do not typically have the 
                                                   
14) Ibidem, p. 275. 
15) See GILLIAN HADFIELD, Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans 
Invented Law and how to Reinvent it for a Complex Global Economy, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016. 
16) See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy 
and Leviathan, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1975. 
17) See HADFIELD, Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans Invented Law 
and how to Reinvent it for a Complex Global Economy, cit., p. 89. 
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legal infrastructure tailored and constructed just for our 
purposes. The legal infrastructure must be general enough to 
allow entrepreneurs with different kinds of plans to plug into it 
and make use of it. As such, the legal infrastructure seems to be 
a part of the environment – «it was there before you got here»18 
– which may be the case why economists often take it as an 
exogenous variable. But law is an economic input, there is an 
economic demand for law. That legal infrastructure enters into 
any production function along with other production factors 
that form parts of the entrepreneurial plan is a key point that 
we should take into account while developing a theory of 
capital that defines capital goods based on their economic 
function19. 
If we admit that there is a sense in which law is an 
infrastructural production factor, we must wonder what the 
market for that production factor looks like. Is there a market 
for law that can be understood in a way as we understand the 
law for other capital goods and production factors in general? 
How are intellectual infractructures produced and reproduced? 
Are they a form of non-perishable capital20? 
Indeed, Dekker and Kuchař21 have argued that certain key 
parts of institutional infrastructures are jointly produced shared 
goods. Consequently, these infrastructures can be seen as a form 
of shared capital goods that are used to facilitate understanding 
                                                   
18) Ibidem, p. 87. 
19) See NICOLAI J. FOSS - GIAMPAOLO GARZARELLI, Institutions as 
Knowledge Capital: Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Interpretative Institutionalism, 
in «Cambridge Journal of Economics», 2007, 31(5), 789-804. 
20) See ELINOR OSTROM, Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental 
Concept?, in PARTHA DASGUPTA - ISMAIL SERAGELDIN (edited by), 
Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, The World Bank, Washington 
DC. 2000. 
21) See PAVEL KUCHAŘ - ERWIN DEKKER, Lachmann and Shackle: On 
the Joint Production of Interpretation Instruments (SSRN Scholarly Paper 
No. ID 3072489), Social Science Research Network, Rochester (New 
York) 2017. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3072489  
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of diverse actors, such as buyers and sellers, and that are 
produced and reproduced as we use them. 
Returning to our first critical point, the fact that for 
various reasons – how to deal with the measurement of a flow 
of knowledge? Does an interpersonal comparison of the 
perception of capital value mean anything? – we do not find 
attempts to measure the capital structure particularly useful 
does not mean that we cannot say anything about it or that the 
capital structure is random. There is an intrinsic order to the 
capital structure and observing agents contributing to its 
formation requires an interpretation and understanding of the 
context in which economic agents act, and that goes beyond the 
meaning that the agents assign to their action (see Prychitko in 
this volume). We need, as Karl Popper22 suggested, to 
understand the situational logic that guides economic agents. 
Such an understanding is, in principle, falsifiable. 
Institutions, or at least certain parts of the institutional 
infrastructure, can be seen as networks «of constantly 
renewable meaningful relations between persons and groups of 
persons who may not all ascribe the same meaning to the same 
set of relations»23. These institutional infrastructures, we believe, 
enter into the production process and must thus be seen as a 
kind of a shared capital good. Institutional infrastructures form 
part of the capital structure. The task of a consistently 
subjectivist economic science thus should not be to measure the 
value of these capital goods but rather to extract the meaning 
that they convey to the agents whose actions are enabled and 
constrained by them, and to interpret this meaning of the 
situational logic that they create to others. 
                                                   
22) See KARL R. POPPER, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, in 
THEODOR W. ADORNO (edited by), The Positivist Dispute in German 
Sociology, Heinemann, London 1976. 
23) LUDWIG M. LACHMANN, Austrian Economics: A Hermeneutic 
Approach, in DON LAVOIE (edited by), Economics and Hermeneutics, 
Routledge, London - New York 1990, p. 137. 
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Other capital goods – apart from intellectual 
infractructures – are no different. They do not generate value 
that could be meaningfully measured. Rather, they create 
values or modes of orientation that are open to interpretation 
and understanding. Interpretation and understanding of the 
capital structure should be our key concern. 
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